Meta problem of consciousness summary. May 25, 2022 · Introduction.

Meta problem of consciousness summary ii. : The Meta-Problem of Consciousness and the Phenomenal Concept Strategy pp. 11), ‘I can’t see how consciousness could be physical’ (p. Chalmers sees between the hard problem and the meta-problem: ‘Whatever explains consciousness (the hard problem) should also play a central role in explaining our judgments about consciousness If our ordinary concepts of consciousness were functional concepts, then there would be no hard problem of consciousness, or at least the problem would be much easier to dismiss. reports to the effect that phenomenal consciousness has the various featuresthatgiverisetothe hardproblem. The meta-problem. I address some adjacent issues, but the most common formulation simply claims that consciousness cannot be explained within a physicalist framework. Consciousness presents a “hard problem” to scholars. Abstract I present and I implement what I take to be the best approach to solve the meta-problem: the evidential approach. We are realists about consciousness, like Chalmers. The initial problem is the hard problem of consciousness: why and how do physical processes in the brain illusionism meta-problem of consciousness immediate justification. By contrast, the hard problem and the 6 tion for why people find consciousness so puzzling? 7 Perhaps I am being too quick to equate the ‘problem intuitions’ with 8 the hard problem and the explanatory gap. Here, the topic is clearly the hard problem—the problem of experience. The meta-problem is the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem, or in other terms, the prob-lem of explaining why we think consciousness is hard to explain. The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining these reports. 1 Just as metacognition is cognition about cognition, and a meta-theory is a theory about theories, the meta-problem is a problem about a problem. Chalmers’ meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining “problem reports”; i. , it has no causal impact on our behavior), the belief that there's something unusual about consciousness (the meta problem) cannot be justified solely by evolutionary mechanics, because holding the belief that something is sus about consciousness would not Apr 18, 2016 · David Chalmers is Professor of Philosophy and co-director of the Center for Mind, Brain, and Consciousness at New York University, and also holds a part-time position at the Australian National University. Journal of Consciousness Studies 25 (9-10):6-61 (2018) Abstract The intuition that consciousness is hard to explain may fade away as empirically adequate theories of consciousness develop. Seems easier than the hard problem, with close ties that could inform us about the hard "On the dangers of conflating strong and weak versions of a theory of consciousness. ” Against this, I Mar 9, 2024 · The problem of explaining why we think we have mysterious conscious states, has been given a name and developed into a research program by philosopher David Chalmers, who calls it the meta-problem of consciousness. 54; 8. At stake is how the physical body gives rise to subjective experience. François Kammerer) Abstract: The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why we have the intuition that there is a hard problem of consciousness. The flow of anoetic to noetic and autonoetic consciousness: A vision of unknowing and knowing consciousness in the remembrance of things past and imagined futures. We review socio-historical factors that account for why, as a field, the neuroscience of consciousness has not been particularly successful at developing empirically adequate theories. Despite its scientific study has blossomed during the last three decades (Michel et al. The meta-problem of consciousness is (to a first approximation) the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness. According to Chalmers (2018), the meta-problem of consciousness is 'the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness'. Q: How is the hard problem of consciousness different from the easy problems? The meta-problem of consciousness is (to a first approximation) the problem of explaining why we think that there is a [hard] problem of consciousness. The main tenet of this approach is to explain our problematic phenomenal intuitions by putting our representations of phenomenal states in perspective within the larger frame of the cognitive processes we use to conceive of evidence. Chalmers(Journal ofConsciousnessStudies 25:6–61, 2018, 8) suggests that solving the meta-problem will likely “shed significant David Chalmers在2018年发表了哲学论文《意识的元问题》（The meta-problem of consciousness），这被视为心智哲学上的重要工作。 我将首先概述此文内容。 许多人都承认意识的“困难问题”的存在，即，如何解释我们用感官感受外界输入时所拥有的主观体验？ Jan 29, 2020 · David Chalmers is a philosopher and cognitive scientist specializing in philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and consciousness. Andrew Stark - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association :1-20. I would really like to see that get funded and I’d love to be involved with it. 6 tion for why people find consciousness so puzzling? 7 Perhaps I am being too quick to equate the ‘problem intuitions’ with 8 the hard problem and the explanatory gap. Here I present what I think is the best approach to answer the meta-problem: the evidential approach. 1 Just as metacognition is cognition about cognition, and a metatheory is a theory about theo-ries, the metaproblem is a problem about a problem. One of the problems with thinking about consciousness is that it’s been too 9 discussion of the meta-problem. Think about when you have an epiphany. Finding the biological basis of consciousness is sometimes considered as one of the major unsolved puzzles of contemporary science (Miller, 2005). You argue that in a deterministic world where consciousness is an epiphenomenon (i. I distinguish between the easy problems and the hard problem, and I argue that the hard problem eludes conventional methods of explanation. Chalmers introduces the 9 problem intuitions by appeal to the verbal reports that ordinary people 10 make about consciousness. I believe that their accumulated psychological material could help explain many aspects of the problem of consciousness and the meta-problem, if approached from the right angle and with an adequate explanatory framework. In reverse, if we had a solution to the meta-problem, we should expect it to shed some light on the hard problem. Chalmers (Journal of Consciousness Studies 25: 6–61, 2018, 8) suggests that solving the meta-problem will likely “shed significant light on the hard problem. Here, I show how the “hard problem” emerges Feb 13, 2023 · The meta-problem of consciousness . The Meta-Problem of Consciousness The meta-problem of consciousness is (to a first approximation) the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness. Sciopartum, the book. He is perhaps best known for formulating the hard problem of consciousness which could be stated as “why does the feeling which accompanies awareness of sensory information exist at all?” This conversation is part of the Artificial Intelligence podcast. Those problem reports have no obvious explanation: the meta problem of consciousness is explaining those reports. Marie Vandekerckhove & Jaak Panksepp - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (4):1018-1028. So any view that says there is phenomenal consciousness only in a sense where this is understood functionally is in effect a view where our ordinary (non-functionally The meta-problem of consciousness is (to a first approximation) the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness. The most promising solutions to the meta-problem reviewed by Chalmers The meta-problem of consciousness, according to David Chalmers, is (roughly) the problem of explaining why we think there is a problem of consciousness. uk Chalmers offers of problem reports include, ‘Consciousness is hard to explain’ (p. The harder problem of consciousness. David Chalmers briefly notes that my phenomenal powers view The ambiguity of the term "consciousness" is often exploited by both philosophers and scientists writing on the subject. 33735/phimisci. 1 The commentaries divide fairly nearly into about three groups. The meta-problem gets its name from the fact that it is a problem about a problem: it is the problem of explaining why we think we core of what Chalmers calls the meta-problem of consciousness. Added to PP 2020-05-21 Downloads 650 (#32,698) 6 months 95 (#59,500) Journal of Consciousness Studies 2(3):200-19, 1995. 62-73(12) Author: Diaz-Leon, E. e. No References. Editorial Introduction: Debates on the Meta-Problem of Consciousness. This has an unexpected resolution when one moves to 11 an interventionist account of scientific explanation: the same interventions that resolve the 12 hard problem should also resolve the meta-problem. Equivalently, it is the problem of explain-ing why people have problem intuitions: dispositions to make certain key judgments that underlie the problem of consciousness. It is common to see a paper on consciousness begin with an invocation of the mystery of consciousness, noting the strange intangibility and ineffability of subjectivity, and worrying that so far we have no theory of the phenomenon. Evidence, Explanation, and Experience. 6). One possibility is that the challenge arises from ontology—because consciousness is a special property/substance that is irreducible to the physical. " Philosophy and the Mind Sciences, 1(II) (2020) 10. In his "second approximation", he says it is the problem of explaining the behavior of " phenomenal reports", and the behavior of expressing a belief that there is a hard problem of consciousness. I am grateful to the authors of the 39 commentaries on my article “The Meta-Problem of Consciousness”. Jan 1, 2021 · In a recent paper in this journal, David Chalmers introduced the meta-problem of consciousness as "the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem" (Chalmers, 2018, p. *H Lau, M Michel. Ned Block - 2003 - Disputatio 1 (15):4-49. The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why there seems to be a hard problem of consciousness. We are also materialists and naturalists (Barron and Klein, 2016), unlike Chalmers. I learned a great deal from reading them and from thinking about how to reply. The hard problem of consciousness has multiple variations. In this paper I argue that the key to understanding both consciousness itself and addressing the meta-problem is to understand what acquaintance is and what its objects are. Reprint years. Here, the topic is clearly the hard problem May 22, 2020 · Chalmers’ meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining “problem reports”; i. We suggest that the core of the meta-problem is the seeming 10 arbitrariness of subjective experience. Oct 24, 2024 · 1 Introduction. This has been termed the meta problem of consciousness, meaning the reasons some think there is any hard problem at all 2. Summary. This paper introduces the Meta-Construct Problem of Consciousness, a novel extension of David Chalmers’ progression from the hard problem to the meta-problem of consciousness. We argue that emotions and the sense of self function as adaptive mechanisms Aug 30, 2021 · So the hard problem is actually hard for some approaches, for other approaches is in fact a non-problem. See full list on imprint. 13 The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why we have the intuition that there is a hard problem of consciousness. This argument does not require me to argue that. 7). He is well-known for his work in the philosophy of mind, especially for his formulation of the “hard problem” of consciousness. If consciousness is explained purely materialistically, you're rejecting hard problem, so the meta problem is actually the only problem. By contrast, the hard problem and the The hard problem of consciousness and the meta-problem are closely connected. A far less extravagant option is to endorse the illusionist response and conclude that the meta-problem is not a meta-problem at all but the problem of consciousness. If we had a solution to the hard problem, we would expect it to shed some light on the meta-problem. May 25, 2022 · Introduction. Is meta-consciousness not just a subset of phenomenal consciousness? What is meta-consciousness if it's not also phenomenally conscious? Let me give you an example of the sort of unconscious mind I was talking about. Just as metacognition is cognition about cognition, and a meta-theory is a theory about theories, the meta-problem is a problem about a problem. reports to the effect that phenomenal consciousness has the various features that give rise to the hard problem. The meta problem more interesting from a materialist perspective than the hard problem itself. Analytics. Chapter 19: Self Awareness, Mary’s Room & The Meta Problem of Consciousness. Meta-ethics: Metaphysics: Normative ethics: Aug 11, 2023 · Abstract. However, philosophical arguments commonly subsumed as the “hard problem” of consciousness question the possibility of this endeavor, at least with respect to subjective experience (Chalmers, 1995). Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism, by Galen Strawson; The Meta-Problem of Consciousness, by David Since the problem of consciousness arises from a flawed theory of consciousness, pointing out the mechanisms underlying expression of the theory and the historical origins of the theory will not suffice to tell us why the theory is problematic. In a recent paper in this journal, David Chalmers introduced the meta-problem of consciousness as “the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem” (Chalmers, 2018, p. If there's no hard problem, why do people think there's a hard problem? Jan 7, 2022 · PDF | On Jan 7, 2022, Michael Prost published The Meta-Problem of Philosophy and the Solution to the Hard Problem and the Meta-Problem of Consciousness | Find, read and cite all the research you . Illusionism provides one way in which the meta-problem could shed light on the hard problem Dec 13, 2024 · A: The meta-problem of consciousness is a problem closely tied to the hard problem of consciousness, focusing on behavior and the challenges of understanding subjective experiences. At the same time, a solution will almost certainly have consequences for the hard problem of consciousness. Why consciousness is “hard”, however, is uncertain. Nov 22, 2021 · The Meta-problem of consciousness Quotes from the interview [The meta-problem] is a hugely interdisciplinary thing. Apr 6, 2019 · David Chalmers is famous as the philosopher who coined the hard problem of consciousness, the idea that how and why consciousness is produced from a physical system, how phenomenal experience arises from such a system, is an intractably difficult issue. At a first pass, we think that the meta-problem arises due to limited access to complex brain states, along with a false belief that The Meta-Problem of Consciousness and the Evidential Approach. : "A socio-historical take on the meta-problem of consciousness" Journal of consciousness studies 26 (9-10), 136-147 (2019) 9. Apr 27, 2022 · When we express our sense that it is a problem: “There is a hard problem of consciousness”, “It seems nonphysical”. co. Understanding consciousness is one of the most exciting endeavors of human knowledge. 12), and ‘Explaining behaviour does not explain consciousness’ (p. Chalmers. In his paper, titled 'The Meta-Problem of Consciousness', published last year in this journal, David Chalmers did a great service to the field of consciousness studies by laying down a Our “Cognitive Limitations” and the Hard Problem of Consciousness. François Kammerer - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):124-135. *B Odegaard, RT Knight, H Lau. Forthcoming in Journal of Consciousness Studies (symposium on David Chalmers’ “The Meta-Problem of Consciousness”, ed. As such, the meta-problem is exclusionary toward soft-wired illusionism. Add more citations scientists writing on the subject. There are reasons why this may seem intuitive to some, but modern evidence and academic consensus suggest otherwise. Illusionism proposes that consciousness is an illusion, challenging beliefs about consciousness through the meta-problem and facing opposition due to its Summary of Chapters 15-20 for the Casual Reader. About half of them discuss potential solutions to the meta-problem. This is something that we need a big collaborative project on. The answer would involve heavy-duty metaphysical theorizing, probably including a commitment either to substance dualism or to the existence of a mysterious intrinsic subjectivity. A lack of meta-consciousness can account for why we seem to have 'unconscious' states. Mar 27, 2024. Add to favourites Favourites: ADD. The meta-problem is strictly speaking an easy problem, and solving it is a tractable empirical project for cognitive scientists. David Chalmers briefly notes that my phenomenal powers view may be able to answer to this challenge in a way that avoids problems (having to do with avoiding coincidence) facing other realist views. The meta-problem of consciousness, introduced by David Chalmers, aims to explain why we perceive a problem with consciousness, offering a different approach that may dissolve the hard problem. A solution to the meta-problem could shed light on the hard problem of consciousness. 2019), studies on awareness and subjective experience were already being conducted in the late 19th century, at the inception of psychology as a scientific discipline, and continued throughout the 20th experience the higher or deeper states of consciousness postulated by these systems. This is the paper where I introduced the “hard problem” of consciousness. About a quarter of them discuss the question of whether intuitions about In “The Meta-Problem of Consciousness”, David Chalmers presents the meta-problem of consciousness: the problem of explaining phenomenal intuitions in a topic-neutral way. Namely, there is no way, even in principle, to reduce the qualities of conscious experience to physical entities, which are purely quantitative. This paper challenges long-held beliefs about consciousness and selfhood, proposing that these phenomena—far from being intrinsic or metaphysical—are evolved survival tools. David J. Philosopher David Chalmers elucidated the hard problem of consciousness in 1995. If Sep 21, 2024 · Abstract. 1 Just as metacognition is cognition about cognition, and a metatheory is a theory about theories, the metaproblem is a problem about a problem. I expressed sympathy with about seven of them as elements of a solutions: introspective models, phenomenal concepts, independent roles, introspective opacity, immediate knowldge, primitive quality attri-bution, and primitive relation attribution. In the target article, I canvassed about 15 potential solutions to the meta-problem. Two Caveats to the Meta NOTE: I am not saying that consciousness itself disproves atheism/materialism. 2020. cesses give rise to consciousness. This argument is instead about what some call the “Meta Problem” of consciousness. (though I do ofcourse think consciousness is best explained by souls, but I’m not going to talk about that in this paper) The Meta-Problem of Consciousness. qqosqk gvles ethb dxtfw kwnv qaiubjc fqemmkp rfvo rxy phdyz